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Abstract 
 
We estimate the evolution of healthcare demand under the influence of income growth and 
population aging with two samples of patients surveyed in the same regions, but with an 
interval of 18 years in rural China and with mixed logit to deal with heterogeneity. In 
accordance with theoretical and inductive inferences, it is found that healthcare price effects 
decreased and became more heterogeneous. Aging impact overweighed income growth 
impact, resulting in increasing distance effect and patients’ preference to proximity. In the 
face of this demand change, the adjustment of governmental supply should be to promote 
small and middle-sized healthcare providers. However during this period to cope with 
urbanization, the Chinese policy consisted of privileging large hospitals. This has led to a 
higher share of patients, especially the aging patients, to choose self-care and a higher share of 
poorer patients to suffer from catastrophic health expenditures. This finding carries broad 
implications for rural health policy-making on, along with income growth, population aging 
and urbanization, how to provide better coverage of rural areas by enough qualified and 
multifunctional small and middle-sized healthcare providers in the developing world.  
 
KEY-WORDS: Two-period healthcare demand comparison, mixed logit model, price and 
distance effects, heterogeneity, insurance, rural China. 
 
JEL Classification: D1, C5, I1. 
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1. Introduction 
This study assesses the evolution of healthcare demand in terms of the choice of 
healthcare provider over an 18-year period in rural China. From the CHNS data source, we 
construct two data sets of patients: a 1989-1993 sample and a 2004-2006 sample, surveyed in 
the same villages in nine Chinese provinces. The originality of our samples resides in the 
evaluation of the healthcare demand change of the same population after a long interval in 
which the average patient becomes richer but ages. In the constitution of the samples for 
comparative study, it is very difficult to satisfy at once these three requisites: 1) the patients 
are surveyed within the same population but are in two different times; 2) the time interval is 
long enough to observe income growth and population aging; and 3) the income has 
substantially increased. The satisfaction of the two first requirements could be realized in 
most regions, for instance in Africa. Nevertheless, only in a few countries where a rapid 
income growth has occurred can the third requirement be fulfilled. 
With our two-period comparison, we expect to achieve three goals: First, we are 
testing some theoretical and logical inferences. With income growth and population aging, we 
estimate the evolution of the effects of two important factors that determine healthcare 
demand: price and distance.1 On the one hand, with the average per capita income at constant 
prices and the household assets increased two to three fold, and following microeconomic 
theory and inductive reasoning, people will be less sensitive to the price of healthcare and to 
distance but will be more careful on qualitative factors. On the other hand, aging patients with 
less favorable health conditions would be less sensitive to price and more to distance. We 
expect that the tests would confirm these inferences. 
Second, we are measuring preference heterogeneity. With income growth, the choices 
would be more heterogeneous among the patients because budget constraints become softer 
and taste more diversified. People would tend to make their choices more as a function of 
factors like quality and reputation of the healthcare providers. With aging, patients’ choices 
would be more affected by such unobservable factors as intra-household relationships, 
especially between young and aging members. Thus we expect the presence of a larger degree 
of heterogeneity of price effects in the 2004-2006 sample relating to the 1989-1993 sample. 
On the contrary, the evolution of preference heterogeneity of distance is uncertain since 
                                                          
1
 Distance is an important factor that conditions healthcare choices of Chinese rural villagers, first 
because of population aging, and second because of backward transportation conditions in most 
rural areas. 
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income growth would increase, while aging would reduce this heterogeneity. In traditional 
econometric treatments, the focus is on mean effects. The heterogeneity between the 
observations is treated as an unknown and is put in the error term. Since measuring “how 
different” between the observations is also of crucial importance in health economics, we use 
a mixed multinomial logit model that can quantitatively assess the extent of heterogeneity. On 
the other hand, in the presence of significant preference heterogeneity, it is better than an 
ordinary multinomial logit because the later could bias the estimation due to its unrealistic 
assumption of “independence from irrelevant alternatives” (IIA). 
Third, we are exploring the implications of demand evolution for the adjustment of 
medical care supply and policymaking. With the two-period comparative estimations on the 
evolution of patients’ demand in terms of the choice of healthcare provider, we will check 
whether the Chinese rural medical care supply adapted to this change through planning a 
rational geographical structure of healthcare providers around the villages during the period. 
In the case of maladjustment, what were the consequences? 
The analysis of our samples arouses a general interest for most developing countries. 
In these countries, as population aging is a common process and income growth occurs at 
different paces, what is the evolution of rural healthcare demand as a function of these two 
key factors? Has the adjustment of supply adapting to it been a major concern for health 
policymakers? 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the evolution of the Chinese 
rural healthcare market, and in particular the supply and demand side changes between 1989 
and 2006. Section 3 presents the methodology and data. Section 4 analyzes the results of 
estimations and explores the implications for policy-making.  Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
2. Background  
There is abundant literature on healthcare provider choice in developing countries. As 
explanatory factors, income and price have always received special attention. The results 
obtained led to contradictory conclusions. For Lavy and Guigley (1991), the decision to seek 
medical treatment in Ghana is responsive to household income. Sahn et al. (2003) showed 
that price elasticity of demand for all healthcare options is high in Tanzania. Other studies 
concluded that both price and income are significant determinants of healthcare provider 
choice (Ntembe, 2009 in Cameroon; Lopez-Cevallos and Chi, 2010 in Ecuador). In contrast, 
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Lindelow (2005) showed that income is not an important determinant of healthcare choices in 
Mozambique, and that prices have significant but inelastic influences on the choice. Lawson 
(2004) found a strong income impact in Uganda, while user fees are less significant than one 
might first expect. For Akin et al. (1986), price is not a significant determinant of demand for 
primary healthcare and consequently it does not influence provider choice decisions in the 
Philippines. Other studies showed that healthcare demand is either inelastic or low elastic 
when the quality of care is high or increases (Mariko, 2003; Cissé, 2004). Mocan et al. (2004) 
showed that the medical care demand in urban China in 1989 was price inelastic and slightly 
income elastic.  
All these studies led us to believe that income and price effects might vary across 
countries and over time because of the differences in development levels. In the Chinese case, 
a comparative study on rural China over two distinct periods would be very promising due to 
its rapid transformation of demand and supply side conditions in the healthcare market from 
the beginning of the 1990s to the middle 2000s. 
On the demand side evolution, four aspects in this period may be emphasized. First, 
the rural population saw its income significantly increase, along with income inequality. The 
average GDP growth of China was 9% at this time, and the GDP in 2004 was 8.07 times that 
of 1989 at current prices, and 3.8 times at constant prices. Incomes of rural and urban people 
in 2004 were respectively 4.88 (from 602 to 2936 Yuan) and 6.86 times that of 1989. At 
constant prices, the income of rural people in 2004 was 2.3 times that of 1989. According to 
the Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 2008, the Gini coefficients of the rural population 
increased from 0.305 to 0.369 between 1988 and 2004.  
Second, household healthcare expenditures had risen considerably. According to the 
Chinese Health Statistic Yearbook 2005, the per capita annual health expenditure in rural 
regions rose 7.39 times from 38.8 to 286.6 Yuan at current prices, and the portions in the 
charge of households from 14 to 157 Yuan between 1990-2002, a more than 10 times increase. 
The reason for this increase was that, on the one hand, there was a trend toward the public 
disengagement from the healthcare sector and an increase in out-of-pocket payments (that will 
be shown in Table 1). On the other hand to keep healthcare affordable, the government set 
prices for basic healthcare services at below cost. At the same time, the government wanted 
facilities to survive financially, so it set prices for new and high-tech diagnostic services 
above cost and allowed a 15% profit margin on drugs. This price schedule created perverse 
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incentives so that “although the majority of Chinese health facilities are publicly owned, they 
are really ‘private, for-profit’ in terms of behavior” (Yip and Hsiao, 2009). 
Third, with the disintegration of the Cooperative Medical Service in the 1980s, a great 
majority of rural people lost their cooperative insurance.  Until 2002, more than 80% of rural 
people were not covered by medical insurance. In 2003, the Chinese government initiated the 
New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS).  
Fourth, the aged population is increasing.  In 1990, people more than 65 years old 
represented 5.57% of the population. This percentage reached 9.07% in 2005, with 9.48% and 
8.12% respectively for rural and urban populations (Chinese Population Statistic Yearbook 
2005; Chinese Population and Employment Statistic Yearbook 2007). This means that the 
percentage of the aged population has nearly doubled. According to a study by the ILO, this 
percentage will reach 14.17% by 2020 (Yang and Wang, 2010). The main cause of the 
increasing aged population in China is the application of family planning for limiting births 
for more than the last 50 years. Another rural region-specific reason is that during this period, 
according to our estimation based on the CHNS surveys, about one third of rural household 
members on average left their houses and worked in cities. They were mostly younger and 
thus exacerbated rural population aged statistics. 
On the supply side changes, the share of health expenditures in the GDP in 1990 and 
2004 increased from 4.03% to 5.65% (Chinese Health Statistic Yearbook 2005). Table 1 
shows the trend toward the public disengagement from the health sector and the increase in 
out-of-pocket payments.  
 
Table 1. Shares of government budgetary expenditure, social expenditure and resident individual 
expenditure in total health expenditure. 
 
 1990 2004 
Government budgetary expenditure 25.1 17.0 
Social expenditure 39.2 29.3 
Resident individual expenditure 35.7 53.6 
 
Source: Chinese Health Statistic Yearbook 2005. 
 
 
Another aspect of supply side changes is the evolution of the balance of power 
between county (and above) hospitals, township health centers and village clinics in terms of 
the numbers of institutions, health professionals, beds and visits. As one of the most important 
issues in this study is to check rural China’s supply side deficiencies in the face of demand 
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changes in this period, we will introduce and analyze these indicators in Table 9 of Section 
4.5. 
In the evolution of the demand side factors, we focus on two of them that appear to be 
the most essential, income growth and population aging, and explore their possible influences 
on healthcare demand.  
An obvious effect of general income growth would be that the patients’ choices 
become less sensitive to healthcare prices and more heterogeneous because their budget 
constraints became softer. People would tend to make their choices more as a function of 
factors like quality and reputation of the healthcare providers. The heterogeneity of price 
effects would reflect increasing impact of these unobservable provider-specific attributes and 
patient-specific taste variations. General income growth could also reduce the distance effect 
and make its impact on preference more heterogeneous. 
With aging and health conditions becoming less favorable, patients would be less 
sensitive to price and their choices would be more affected by other factors. Besides 
unobservable healthcare provider attributes and patients’ tastes, there are many aging-specific 
factors. For example, one unobservable factor, the relationship within the households between 
the aging parents and the younger members (sons, daughter-in-law), may lead price sensibility 
to be very different. Another evident effect is that aging people like proximity; thus there may 
be a stronger distance effect and reduced heterogeneity of distance impacts. 
To summarize on the basis of these arguments, with the increases of income and age, 
we expect a decreasing price effect and an increasing heterogeneity in price preferences. Their 
impact on distance effect is uncertain, depending on which influence is more important: the 
income growth that reduces distance effect but increases its heterogeneity, or population aging 
that increases distance effect and reduces its heterogeneity. The estimation results will 
indicate the trends and heterogeneity in distance effects.  
 
3. Methodology 
To take into consideration the economic and demographic changes that occurred in 
China since the 1990’s and their potential effects on healthcare demand, we used two samples 
surveyed within the same region in two periods. During those periods, the most significant 
changes were income growth and population aging. We focus on the evolution of the effects 
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of healthcare price and distance and the extent of heterogeneity on them, after controlling for 
other relevant variables.  
 
3.1 Econometric Modeling 
Let the utility of a patient i	∈	[1, I ] be a function of health status, h, and non-health 
consumption, x.   , 	
                                                                                                                                           (1) 
Health status, h, is determined by the quantity and quality of healthcare (C) and other 
health inputs (e.g., sanitation), food consumption (F); and individual attributes like age, 
gender, education and income (R).   , , 
                                                                                                                                      (2) 
Healthcare demand is a function of the price of healthcare (p) and the distance to the 
healthcare provider (D). The importance of D is that distance not only implies cost of access, 
but also reflects the reputation and quality of providers.2   ,
                                                                                                                                            (3) 
Finally, the other health input, F, is a function of expenditures on these inputs ().   
                                                                                                                                                (4) 
With equations (1) to (4), we have the indirect utility function in the case where 
individual i chooses healthcare provider j in which      is the budget for non-health 
consumption (y is income). ∗  , , 
, ,     					                                                                   (5) 
Among the healthcare provider alternatives, the patient will choose the one that 
maximizes his/her indirect utility function. This is expressed by equation (6).   , if ∗  	∗ ,  ∗ , …"∗
   #, otherwise                                                                                                                                    (6) 
To make the model amenable to econometric estimation, we must define a functional 
form of the above indirect utility function. This is expressed by equation (7) in which the first 
term on the right is the deterministic component of utility in the function of the above-defined 
four types of attributes and the second term is a disturbance term. The term  is unobserved 
and is treated as one part of the error term.  
                                                          
2
  Large healthcare providers must be set in towns or in cities. Consequently, their distance is farther 
than small healthcare providers in the proximity of the rural villages. 
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  ∗, , ,  $ %                                                                                                                  (7) 
Equation (7) must be parameterized to allow estimations. The first term can be 
rewritten as: ∗. 
  '() $ *(			                                                                                                                           (8) 
The X variables are patient-specific characteristics such as age, marital status, 
insurance status and income. The Z variables are alternative health provider-specific 
characteristics such as distance, price, healthcare quality and so on. In these defined variables, 
we have   + $ ( $ (  $ (, $ (- $ %	                                                                                 (9) 
The variable p, the healthcare price, and D, the distance to healthcare provider are two 
provider-specific variables. The y, income and R, individual attributes other than income are 
patient-specific variables. Thus in our econometric estimations, p and D are kept constant 
across options while y and all components of R vary across options.  
The generally used model to estimate healthcare-seeking behavior is the multinomial 
Logit (MNL). As the MNL model is based on the assumption of “independent and identically 
distributed” (IID), and hence on the assumption of IIA, its failure to deal with heterogeneity 
can result in inferior model specification, spurious test results and invalid conclusions 
(Louviere et al. 2000; Train 2003). Heterogeneity caused by alternative attributes and 
individual preferences can branch into three major topics: 1) unobserved heterogeneity in 
alternatives; 2) taste variation of the deciders; and 3) heterogeneous choice sets (Baltas and 
Doyle, 2001). As in middle 2000 relating to the end of 1980, general increases in income and 
age would lead healthcare choices in rural China to be much more heterogeneous. Mixed 
multinomial logit (MMNL) model analysis could give better performance.  
In MNL models, the emphasis is on the mean impact of observed variables and all 
unobserved heterogeneity is classified in error terms. MMNL allows the parameter associated 
with each observed variable to vary randomly across individuals, and this variance reflects the 
unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity. This method decomposes the mean and 
standard deviation of one or more random parameters to reveal sources of systematic taste 
heterogeneity (McFadden and Train, 2000). Several studies have applied MMNL in 
healthcare demand (Harris and Keane, 1999; Borah, 2006; Canaviri, 2007; Hole, 2008; and 
Qian et al., 2009).  
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If equation (9) is estimated with MNL, the basic form of the MMNL, and with 
alternative specific constants . 	and attributes / (here, x represents both z and x variables in 
the equation (8)), the result will be: 
0123
  456	+7(′	
∑ 456	+97(9′ 	9
"9:                                                                                              (10) 
The difference between MMNL and MNL is that in the former, one part of the 
coefficients is random; in the latter, all coefficients are non-random. In equation (10), ;	< is 
composed of ; with 
(  =( $ >′? $ @A	B	1CD2E	(′ 	B	C2C  1CD2E 			                                                                                            (11) 
where ;is the population mean, Fis the individual specific heterogeneity, with mean 
0 and standard deviation 1, and G	is the standard deviation of the distribution of ; around ;. 
The elements of ; 	 are distributed randomly across individuals with fixed means. A 
refinement of the model is to allow the means of the parameter distributions to be 
heterogeneous with observed data	H. This would be a set of choice-invariant characteristics 
that produces individual heterogeneity in the means of the randomly distributed coefficients 
so that selecting subsets of pre-specified variables interact with the mean and standard 
deviation of random parameterized attributes. 
We set both price and distance to healthcare providers as random variables. It would 
be interesting to estimate the heterogeneity in the preferences for both price and distance. In 
particular, we are interested in examination of their interaction with some variables of type w 
in equation (11). Here H  will be composed of six variables: asset, income, urban type 
insurance, cooperative insurance, severity of the illness and rural labor ratio of the village.  
Given that F are individual specific, Gwill reflect unobserved random disturbances: 
the source of the heterogeneity. Thus in the population as stated above, if the random terms 
are normally distributed, 
(I~K21EL	 M(I $ >I′ ?, @I 	N	                                                                                                          (12) 
Equation (12) has useful empirical implications and we will return to them in 
discussing their application. As the usual choice, we will use the normal distribution. Finally, 
to make our model more realistic, we will allow the two random parameters to be correlated.  
 
Etudes et Documents n° 15, CERDI, 2013 
 
 
 
12 
 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1  Survey data and sample 
Data are from the CHNS database edited by the Carolina Population Center (CPC, 
University of North Carolina).3 The survey covers about 16,000 individuals from more than 
3,000 households (about two-thirds from rural and one-third from urban populations) in nine 
representative provinces. It is a longitudinal survey with seven waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 
1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006). 
Several considerations guided the selection of the samples in the 1989 to 2006 period. 
We were interested in the starting and ending periods where a difference in the degree of 
preference heterogeneity is expected. So we decided not to keep data from the middle of the 
period and to build two samples: one for the first period and the other for the second. Within 
each sample, we ensured that income, healthcare prices and supply conditions were not 
significantly evolved over time. The number of the interviewed who were ill was smaller in 
the first waves than in the last (population aging is seemingly the main cause). So to keep 
some equilibrium between the two samples, we merged three time periods of two-year 
intervals (1989, 1991 and 1993) for the first sample and two time periods of two-year 
intervals (2004 and 2006) for the second sample, with 2,117 and 2,594 observations 
respectively. The last waves did not include individuals under 18 years old as the first waves 
did. We conducted a logistic regression analog of the Chow test to check whether the 
healthcare demand of the under-18 individuals differed from that of the over-18 ones (cf. 
Demaris, 2004). The results showed that the two models indeed differed. Consequently, 
observations of individuals under 18 were removed. Finally, our samples included 1,457 rural 
people who reported having been ill in 1989, 1991 or 1993, and 2,594 people who reported 
being ill in 2004 or 2006. 
As our data panel included attrition and replacement, we checked the frequency of the 
patients and whether attrition was non-random. In the 1989-1993 sample, only 11.6% and 
0.06% patients were surveyed two and three times; in the 2004-2006 sample, 16.3% patients 
were surveyed two times. CHNS data collectors have not given more details on attrition. 
                                                          
3
  We thank the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention; the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH; R01-HD30880, DK056350, and R01-HD38700); and the Fogarty 
International Center, NIH, for financial support for the CHNS data collection and analysis files since 
1989. We thank those parties, the China-Japan Friendship Hospital, and the Ministry of Health for 
support for CHNS 2009 and future surveys. 
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Nevertheless, as Deaton (1997) stated, the rate of refusal of participation is lower in 
developing countries. It must be still lower in rural China since political institutions exert 
strong control. Villagers in and out of participation must be mainly attributable to their 
absence, their moves or their deaths. Therefore, attrition can be regarded as random. 
 
3.2.2  Definitions of variables 
Table 2 presents all variables that were used and their definitions. The first five items 
(V, T, C, O, S) concern the dependent variable spread in a selected set of healthcare providers. 
All the following variables concern the independent variables. With the exception of the first 
five and the last three, all the remaining variables, are individual-specific attributes. The last 
three variables were used to take into account the environmental features. Rural population 
rate is a proxy of the development level of the village; village size is a proxy of the village 
clinic’s size; and suburb reflects the proximity of the village to the urban medical 
infrastructure. 
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Table 2. Variable definitions. 
 
Village-C  (V) =1 if the choice of treatment is village clinic; =0 otherwise. 
Town-C    (T) =1 if the choice of treatment is township health center; =0 otherwise. 
County-H  (C) =1 if the choice of treatment is county or higher level city hospital; =0 otherwise. 
Other-type  (O) =1 if the source of treatment is pharmacy, private clinic and other clinic; =0 otherwise. 
Self-care (S) =1 if self-treatment is chosen; =0 otherwise. PP Medical expense at constant prices of alternative j after eventual reimbursement by 
insurance multiplied by 10ST; j=V, T, C, O, S. The expense of self-care is assumed =0. Dist0P =1 if distance <0.5 km; =0 otherwise; j=V, T, C, O. Dist1P =1 if distance >=0.5 km & <3; =0 otherwise; j=V, T, C, O. Dist2P =1 if distance >=3 km &<10km; =0 otherwise; j=V, T, C, O. Dist3P =1 if distance >=10 km; =0 otherwise; j=V, T, C, O. 
Age Age of the patient in the wave. 
Female =1 if the patient is female; =0 if male.  
Marital =1 if the patient is married; =0 otherwise.  
Edu_level =1 graduated from primary school; =2 lower middle school degree; =3 upper middle 
school degree; =4 technical or vocational degree; =5 university or college degree; =6 
master’s degree or higher.  
Urban_job =1 if the patient’s job is not farmer; =0 otherwise.  
Farmer =1 if the patient’s job is farmer; =0 otherwise.  
No_job =1 if the patient has not job;=0 otherwise. 
No_insured =1 if the patient is not insured; =0 otherwise. 
Urban_insurance =1 if for family members, the patient’s insurance is one of the following types: 
commercial, free medical, workers compensation, and for the members that are urban 
employee, pass-way model, block model, catastrophic disease; =0 otherwise. 
Cooperative_insurance =1 if the patient’s insurance type is rural cooperative; =0 otherwise. 
Other_insurance =1 if the patient’s insurance is other than Urban_insurance and Cooperative_insurance 
(they include among others Health insurance for women and children, EPI (expanded 
program of immunization) and insurance for children); =0 other wise. 
Severity =1 if the illness or injury not severe; =2 somewhat severe; =3 quite severe. 
Fever =1 if individual suffered from fever; =0 otherwise. 
Chronic =1 if individual suffered from chronic diseases; =0 otherwise. 
Other_deseases =1 if individual suffered from diseases other than fever and chronic diseases; =0 
otherwise. 
Hhsize The number of the household members. 
Income The annual per capita income at constant prices of the household multiplied by 10-3.  
Asset The annual household value of the asset index. 
Rural_popu_rate The share of the rural employees in total labor of the village. 
Village_size The household number of the village multiplied by10-3. 
Suburb =1 if the village is near a city; =0 otherwise. 
 
 
The CHNS database provides household per head annual income at a constant price. 
The variable “Income” was used to estimate the effect of income on the choice of healthcare 
provider. Nevertheless, we consider that income only partially reflects the economic and 
financial states of households and individuals. Furthermore, linked with the specifics of farm 
activities, incomes are often too volatile and some households have declared negative income. 
Another problem is the extent to which incomes are measured with non-random errors. Thus, 
following several authors (Sahn and Stifel, 2000; Filmer and Kinnon, 2008), we judged it 
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necessary to build an asset index and simultaneously used income and asset to measure the 
income and wealth effect. It could be assumed that their impact on healthcare choice can be 
sensibly different. For instance, income could have a stronger effect on the provider choices 
(including self-care) in the case of relatively moderate illness. Asset could be more influential 
on choices in the case of serious illness, since an important expenditure is concerned. 
Therefore, the simultaneous use of income and asset as explanatory variables could address 
the distinct effects. We used the following items for asset index:  
1) Drinking water (4 choices);  
2) Toilet facilities (8 choices);  
3) Kind of lighting (5 choices);  
4) Kind of fuel for cooking (8 choices);  
5) Type of ownership of house (6 choices);  
6) Ownership of electrical appliances and other goods (the number of appliances 
varied between 15 to 18 according to the periods of survey, and this 
information was absent only in 1989);  
7) Means of transportation (5 types);  
8) Type of farm machinery (5 types); and  
9) Household commercial equipment (6 types).  
For each wave, we used principal components analysis to derive weights (Filmer and 
Kinnon, 2008) on the basis of all rural households surveyed in the CHNS project. Then we 
only kept the obtained asset index for the households that declared having patients. 
Coefficients of correlation between income and asset were 0.29 for both periods (1989-1993 
and 2004-2006) and were significant at 1%.  
One interesting feature of Asset index is that as all items contained in Asset index have 
qualitative features,  and thus reflect to a larger extent (like Income) per capita rather than 
overall household wealth. This enhances their comparability. Since the correlation is not so 
high, both variables could be simultaneously introduced in the model. 
A second point is how to compensate for missing prices of healthcare. MMNL 
requires the prices of all the alternative providers, while in the survey only the prices of the 
providers that the patients visited were recorded. So the prices of alternative providers that 
patients did not visit needed to be imputed. Following Gertler et al. (1987), Gertler and van 
der Gaag (1990), and Borah (2006), we used the  Stata ICE program created by Royston 
(2004) to impute the lacking price data. All reported prices were converted at constant prices 
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using the weights given by the CHNS data provider. The chosen predictors of prices included 
16 variables: Age, Female, Marital, Edu_level, Urban_job, Farmer, Income, Severity, Year, 
Province, Urban_insurance, Cooperative_insurance, Other_insurance, Fever, Chronic, and 
hospitalized (=1 if hospitalized; =0 otherwise). The regressions were separately operated 
according to the healthcare provider choices (V, T, C and O). The descriptive statistics of 
imputed plus actual prices by type of providers are presented in Table 3. 
A third point is that since severity is a perception variable, it may be determined by a 
series of non-observables that jointly determine the choice of providers. One way to measure 
the “objectiveness” of the reported severity is to observe the prices paid after treatments. In 
1989-1993, the average prices paid for severity 1, 2 and 3 were respectively 46, 122 and 234 
Yuan, and in 2004-2006, they were 90, 191, and 541 Yuan. Even their proportional increases 
by degree of severity remained stable between the two samples. Thus, we concluded that their 
perceptive severities were also highly objective and endogeneity was not a concern. 
A last point of interest was insurance. If the extent to which the possibility of choice of 
insurance is large, like with severity, the problem of endogeneity may also appear.  We argue 
that at least in the studied period, there was not really a possibility of insurance choices for 
rural people. Besides the people with urban jobs and hence automatically insured by their 
enterprises, most peasants got insurance because the government decided that the villages 
where they lived began to be covered by cooperative insurance. In both cases, the freedom of 
choice was low. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics. 
 1989-1993 (n=1457) 2004-2006 (n=2594) 
Sample distribution 
by provider choice 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Village-C 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Town-C 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.14 0.35 0 1 
County-H 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Other-type     0.11 0.32 0 1 
Self-care 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
P_V 0.074 0.078 0 0.477 0.096 0.079 0 0.598 
P_T 0.159 0.162 0 0.859 0.207 0.169 0 1.166 
P_C 0.466 0.617 0 3.506 0.651 0.597 0 3.808 
P_O     0.204 0.318 0 3.972 
Dist0_V 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Dist0_T 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Dist1_T 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Dist2_T 0.21 0.40 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Dist3_T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dist0_C 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.23 0.41 0 1 
Dist1_C 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Dist2_C 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Dist3_C 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Dist0_O     0.63 0.48 0 1 
Dist1_O     0.26 0.44 0 1 
Dist2_O     0.09 0.29 0 1 
Dist3_O     0.02 0.15 0 1 
Age 44.47 15.41 18 92 55.88 15.12 18 97 
Female 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Marital 0.84 0.37 0 1 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Edu_level 0.98 1.06 0 5 1.17 1.21 0 6 
Urban_job 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.13 0.35 0 1 
Farmer 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
No_job 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1 
No_insured 0.80 0.40 0 1 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Urban_insurance 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Cooperative_insurance 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Other_insurance 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Severity 1.71 0.70 1 3 1.70 0.67 1 3 
Fever 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Chronic 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Other_diseases 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Hhsize 4.40 1.50 1 13 3.66 1.69 0 13 
Income 2.91 2.26 0.45 22.20 7.03 8.03 0.18 210.95 
Asset 0.39 0.77 -1.05 3.08 1.20 0.96 -0.62 3.87 
Rural_popu_rate 0.52 0.34 0 1 0.41 0.30 0 1 
Village_size 0.66 0.74 0.03 6.00 1.01 1.19 0.04 8.00 
Suburb 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1 
 
 
Table 3 calls for some comments. First in comparing the two samples, we observe the 
aging trend. The average age of the 2004-2006 sample was around 10 years higher than that 
of 1989-1993, and according to more detailed calculation, with the share of patients older than 
60 rising from less than 20% to more than 40%. Second when comparing the two samples, the 
choice for village clinic (48% in 1989-1993) was considerably reduced (to 22% in 2004-2006). 
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It was only partially compensated by Other-type. 4  Third, the choice of self-care was 
significantly increased (from 21% to 35%). While population aging is a natural trend, the 
explanations on the reduction of the choice of village clinic and the drastic increase of the 
choice for self-care depended a lot on the results of our forthcoming estimations. We will 
return to these questions in the next section. 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
For reference in the subsequent discussions in this section, Table 4 presents the results 
of MMNL estimations. 
 
Table 4. Results of multinomial mixed logit regressions 
 
 1989-1993 2004-2006 
 Village-C Town-C County-H Village-C Town-C County-H Other-Type 
Price                      -2.72            (-2.50)**                         -1.61              (-2.66)*** 
Dist1                      -0.68            (-0.82)                         -1.43              (-3.09)*** 
Dist2                      -0.85            (-0.94)                         -1.95              (-2.96)*** 
Dist3                      -1.02            (-0.59) 
 
                        -2.68              (-3.78)*** 
        
Intercept 0.05 -1.28 -2.34 -0.96 -0.78 0.66 -0.82 
 (0.08) (-1.53) (-1.84)* (-1.85)* (-1.23) (0.91) (-1.17) 
Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.001 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (-3.01)*** (-2.09)** (-0.71) (-0.19) (-0.88) (-2.82)*** (-1.56) 
Edu_level 1.12 0.07 -0.002 -0.06 -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 
 (1.31) (0.64) (-0.01) (-0.92) (-1.46) (-1.87)* (-1.07) 
Women 0.45 0.27 0.34 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09 
 (2.93)*** (1.38) (1.22) (0.60) (-0.19) (-0.53) (-0.59) 
Hhsize -0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.002 -0.01 -0.12 
 (-0.36) (0.76) (0.75) (-0.25) (0.04) (-0.29) (-2.27)** 
Asset 0.40 0.42 -0.15 -0.11 0.03 0.13 0.04 
 (2.58)** (1.77)* (-0.39) (-1.15) (0.20) (0.88) (0.34) 
Income -0.02 -0.05 0.06 -0.002 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.56) (-0.81) (0.60) (-0.21) (-0.77) (0.46) (-0.81) 
Severity 0.44 0.69 0.55 0.37 0.74 0.40 0.41 
 (3.86)*** (3.74)*** (1.93)* (3.72)*** (5.74)*** (2.31)** (3.19)*** 
Marital 0.38 0.41 0.64 0.05 0.15 0.33 0.17 
 (2.01)** (1.62) (1.80)* (0.32) (0.80) (1.82)* (0.92) 
Urban_insurance -0.11 0.24 0.28 -0.42 -0.06 0.31 0.06 
 (-0.37) (0.57) (0.48) (-1.39) (-0.19) (0.92) (0.19) 
Cooperative_insurance 0.51 1.01 2.41 0.27 0.002 -0.33 0.14 
 (0.95) (1.14) (2.23)** (1.62) (0.01) (-0.86) (0.55) 
Urban_job 0.50 0.23 0.11 -0.04 0.08 -0.68 -0.26 
 (1.79)* (0.64) (0.25) (-0.20) (0.34) (-2.87)*** (-1.04) 
Farmer 0.16 0.003 -0.27 0.09 -0.08 -0.42 -0.06 
 (0.64) (0.01) (-0.64) (0.59) (-0.46) (-2.16)** (-0.34) 
Fever -0.21 -0.64 -0.68 0.89 0.38 -0.80 0.67 
 (-1.35) (-3.03)*** (-2.36)** (6.12)*** (2.12)** (-3.93)*** (3.78)*** 
Chronic 0.07 -0.28 0.07 -0.06 -0.15 -0.15 -0.43 
 (0.31) (-0.94) (0.16) (-0.42) (-0.89) (-0.98) (-2.34)** 
Rural_popu_rate 0.49 0.61 1.003 0.63 -0.12 -0.09 -0.24 
 (1.40) (1.16) (1.05) (2.15)** (-0.31) (-0.13) (-0.56) 
Village_size 0.23 -0.10 0.42 -0.09 0.03 0.08 -0.09 
 (1.69)* (-0.48) (2.29)** (-1.09) (0.38) (1.29) (-1.15) 
                                                          
4
  Other-type includes in general very small healthcare providers that practice Chinese medicine near a 
pharmacy, or the retired doctors that open a clinic with elementary equipment. They are far from 
being a growing alternative force to the three principal healthcare providers. 
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Suburb -0.06 -0.55 0.16 -0.43 -1.63 -0.28 -0.10 
 (-0.20) (-1.49) (0.29) (-1.89)* (-5.82)*** (-1.02) (-0.38) 
Province and wave dummies included included included included included included included 
        
 Heterogeneity in 
mean 
parameters 
      
P:Asset 0.21 (0.50)   -0.19 (-1.28)    
P:Income -0.08 (-0.68)   -0.002 (-0.16)    
P:Urban_insurance 0.35 (0.51)   0.43 (1.08)    
P:Cooperative_insurance -2.08 (-1.26)   0.10 (0.37)    
P:Severity 0.70 (2.01)**   0.76 (3.83)***    
P:Rural labor -0.29 (-0.32)   -0.29 (-0.63)    
Dist1: Asset 0.06 (0.23)   0.20 
(1.59) 
   
Dist1:Income 0.08 (1.06)   -0.004 (-
0.23) 
   
Dist1:Urban_insurance -0.27 (-0.55)   0.12 
(0.36) 
   
Dist1:Cooperative_insurance -0.27 (-0.28)   0.04 
(0.15) 
   
Dist1:Severity 0.14 (0.60)   0.22 (1.48)    
Dist1:Rural_popu_rate 0.21 (0.33)   0.26 (0.62)    
Dist2: Asset -0.25 (-0.67)   0.27 (1.57)    
Dist2:Income 0.10 (1.06)   0.04 (1.94)*    
Dist2:Urban_insurance 0.62 (0.97)   0.22 (0.46)    
Dist2:Cooperative_insurance -1.26 (-0.84)   0.14 (0.44)    
Dist2:Severity 0.34 (1.22)   0.44 (2.27)**    
Dist2: Rural_popu_rate -1.01 (-1.32)   -0.39 (-0.71)    
Dist3: Asset 0.60 (1.12)   0.18 (0.94)    
Dist3:Income -0.01 (-0.06)   -0.04 (-1.42)    
Dist3:Urban_insurance -0.65 (-0.65)   -0.17 (-0.30)    
Dist3:Cooperative_insurance -1.01 (-0.68)   -0.03 (-0.07)    
Dist3:Severity 0.39 (0.92)   0.76 (3.36)***    
Dist3: Rural_popu_rate -1.35 (-1.07)   0.32 (0.45)    
        
SD of parameter 
distributions 
       
PRICE 1.75  (3.73)*** 
1.08 (1.28) 
0.99 (1.49) 
 1.39 (4.85)***    
Dist1  1.08 (3.03)***    
Dist2  1.11 (2.72)***    
Dist3 1.31  (1.17)  0.75 (1.94)*    
        
N  1457   2594   
Log-like  -1640.85   -3448.36   
LR Chi Squared  757.96   1453.04   
McFadden Pseudo R2  0.1876   0.1740   
 
Note: t-Statistics in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; and 
* indicates significance at 10%. 
 
4.1  Price Effects 
Assuming individual rationality, the effect of healthcare price on the choice among the 
healthcare providers must be negative. The higher the price associated with a provider, the 
less likely that provider is to be chosen. From Table 4, according to the MMNL model, in 
both periods there are clear price effects. The estimated means of Price are respectively -2.72 
and -1.61 and are significant at least at 5%, indicating negative price effect but a weaker 
effect in 2004-2006. This result confirms the inference that with a general income increase 
and population aging, price effect on choice tends to be weakened. 
Calculating marginal effects in terms of price elasticity (the percentage of probability 
of choosing the healthcare provider by one percent of price increase) will provide more 
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detailed information at the healthcare provider level than the mean effect estimated in Table 4, 
where the coefficients of Price are estimated across all healthcare providers. In Table 5, we 
observe that whatever the provider choice, price elasticity was weak, especially in the second 
period for county hospitals. This result is in accordance with the theoretical inference that 
healthcare is a necessary good (Koc, 2004). A comparison between 1989-1993 and 2004-2006 
reveals that price elasticity in the first period is indeed higher than in the second period at the 
healthcare provider level. This result is in line with the above analysis on mean price effect of 
MMNL results.  
 
Table 5. Price elasticity of choice by provider type. 
 
 1989-1993 2004-2006 
 Village-C Town-C County-H Village-C Town-C County-H Other-Type 
        
Price elasticity -0.0612 -0.1763 -0.1159 -0.0297 -0.1021 -0.0151 -0.0495 
 
Note: calculated under MMNL using the same variables as in Table 4. 
 
4.2  Distance Effects 
We expect that all else being equal, patients prefer closer to farther healthcare 
providers and hence the coefficients of distance variables would be negative. In Table 4, 
while all coefficients of Distance are negative, only those of 2004-2006 are significant. 
Further, from DIST1 to DIST3, the coefficients in absolute terms are generally rising, 
meaning that as distance is prolonged, the probability to be chosen declines. In comparing the 
results of 1989-1993 and 2004-2006, we observe that the distance effect was stronger in 2004-
2006 with larger coefficients in absolute terms. This is a logical consequence of general 
population aging, since other things being equal, aged people have a stronger proximity 
preference than younger people. This leads us to conclude that, while in 1989-1993 the 
distance did not matter, patients in 2004-2006 had a stronger preference for a health facility 
that was closer to where they lived.   
 
4.3  Preference Heterogeneity 
Several sources for unobservable taste variations of rural patients could be present.  
First is the difference in judgment of the efficiency of Chinese medicine across patients. 
Those believing more in Chinese medicine tend more to choose lower levels of healthcare 
providers, while those trusting more in Western medicine tend to choose higher levels of 
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healthcare providers. Second is the difference of the patients’ perceptions about the efficiency 
of the same type of health providers due to their experience with certain healthcare providers. 
Third is the difference in the connection with a personal relation network. This connection 
with a healthcare provider is different across patients. One patient may prefer a provider just 
because he has a relative working with it.  Four is the subjectivity on self-evaluation of health. 
The social, cultural and psychological factors that shape their self-evaluations are different 
across patients. 
These unobservable factors might exert a larger influence on preferences in the 2004-
2006 sample since with income growth and population aging, price effect was lessened and 
people began to make their choice decisions as a function of these factors. 
The significant (at 1%) standard deviations of the coefficients of Price for both periods 
(1.75 and 1.39) indicate that parameters do indeed vary in the population, and allow one to 
conclude that there is unobserved individual specific heterogeneity in price preferences. A 
generally used method to measure the level of this heterogeneity is to compute the percentage 
of the patients for which the coefficients of Price are above zero. Following equation (12), we 
can easily compute it and table 6 gives the results. In 1989-1993, while about 80 % of patients 
followed the rule that demand falls as price rises, 22.22% of patients did not follow this rule. 
In 2004-2006, the latter was doubled and rose to 38.30%. These results are in accordance with 
our reasoning that preference heterogeneity in price would go with income growth and 
population aging. 
 
Table 6. Extent of heterogeneity measured by percentage of patients of which the coefficients of Price 
or Distance were >0. 
 1989-1993 2004-2006 
Price 22.22% 38.30% 
Distance 1 45.03% 26.00% 
Distance 2 26.73% 26.86% 
Distance 3 13.59% 8.92% 
 
Note: Calculated with equation (12) using Table 4 mean coefficients and SD of parameter distributions.  
 
Heterogeneity decreased from 45.03% to 26.00% in Distance1 and from 13.59% to 
8.92% in Distance3, meaning that patients had less divergence in their preferences for 
proximity in close and far distances. With Distance 2, this heterogeneity was unchanged. In 
line with our reasoning that general income growth would positively affect and population 
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aging would negatively affect the extent of heterogeneity of distance effects, the outcome 
depends on which force was stronger. The comparison of the coefficients of three distance 
dummies leads to concluding that the impact of aging exceeded that of income growth since 
heterogeneity in distance preferences had decreased during the period.  
The “heterogeneity in mean parameters” reflects the influences of observed variables 
over the effects of Price and Distance on choices. For instance, as seen from the 
“heterogeneity in mean parameters”, severity was found to be a significant source of 
preference heterogeneity in price and in distance. The positive sign of this variable implies 
that the sicker preferred to accept higher prices and farther distance in their choice of 
healthcare provider if they thought it would improve their satisfaction.  
  
4.4 Assessing Extent and Origins of Healthcare Exclusion  
The choice among healthcare providers not only reflects the demand. Through the 
choice, the extent of the exclusion from healthcare can also be estimated and the origins 
identified.  
The effects of Severity are the first indication of exclusion. Exclusion is present if 
sicker patients have no better access to healthcare providers. Significant positive coefficients 
are associated with the severity of illness for all provider types over self-care, implying the 
absence of this kind of exclusion. 
Another type of exclusion comes from the difference in income and asset. The 
existence of a positive income and wealth effects on the choice of healthcare provider means 
that richer patients have more access to healthcare than poorer patients, and the later are more 
likely to be excluded from healthcare. According to Table 4 in both periods, income had no 
impact on the choices. In 1989-1993, the coefficient of Asset was significantly positive at 5% 
for village clinic and significantly positive at 10% for township health center. It was 
insignificant for all choices in 2004-2006. Given that in 1989-1993, the choices of village 
clinic and township health center represented 74% of the total choices, we conclude that while 
there was a wealth effect in 1989-1993, it was absent in 2004-2006. This evolution seems to 
be the consequence of the general income growth, which allowed fewer less fortuned patients 
to be excluded from healthcare. As healthcare is a necessary good, general income growth 
serves in priority to satisfy the demand for necessary goods. 
Exclusion effects can also be observed through insurances (Urban_insurance, 
Cooperative_insurance). As the share of patients having cooperative insurance increased from 
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3% to 25%, we expected an insurance effect on the choice of healthcare provider. Table 4 
shows that in 1989-1993, if the cooperative insurance had an effect on the choice of County 
hospital, this effect was absent in 2004-2006 for any choice of healthcare. One possible 
explanation is that the percentage of reimbursement during this period was too low, as stated 
in Audibert et al. (2008) and in Yip and Hsiao (2008).  
Exclusion can also be identified by checking the effects of social status of the patients. 
From sex (Women), marital status (Marital) and education level (Edu_level) to the types of 
job (Urban_job, Farmer), nearly all of them produced insignificant effects. Focusing on Age, 
while in 1989-1993, elderly people significantly preferred self-care to going to the village 
clinic and township health center. In 2004-2006, this significance disappeared and the 
coefficient of Age for the choice of County hospital became negatively significant in 2004-
2006. This appears to be an improvement, since while in 1989-1993, aged people were 
discriminated from access to village clinics and township health centers that constituted 
around 70% of choices; in 2004-2006, this discrimination disappeared, although their worse 
access to county hospitals in 2004-2006 became a new concern.5  
So far, we have checked for the existence of different kinds of exclusion from access 
to healthcare providers and their possible causes. We could conclude that during the period, 
there was an improvement in terms of income and wealth effects due to general income 
growth, and there were no noteworthy exclusions due to socioeconomic status. Yet there 
remained an important type of exclusion: the share of self-care in the total choices increased 
from 21 to 35% during the period. What were the causes? 
In our MMNL estimations, given that self-care was used as the baseline choice and 
there were no systematic exclusion effects due to the differences in socioeconomic status, it 
can be concluded that the growing choice of self-care were not caused by socioeconomic 
status of the patients. Since during the period, the share of patients older than 60 rose from 
less than 20% to more than 40%, we must check its possible link with the growing choice of 
self-care.  
We first analyzed the evolution of choice structure between the two samples. From 
Table 7 within the 1989-1993 sample, the patients over 60 years old had 27.17% choosing 
self-care, higher than the two younger groups. In 2004-2006, the three age groups all 
distinctly increased their shares of self-care, and had roughly reached the same level. 
                                                          
5
  This may be a logical result of healthcare demand change. With population aging, patients preferred 
geographical proximity and dislike going to county hospitals that are distant. 
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Nevertheless, it does not mean that the situation in 2004-2006 was desirable, since it hides an 
exclusion of aged patients: As aged patients have poorer health conditions, if they are equally 
treated, they should have a lower share of choice of self-care. 
Table 7. Evolution of choice structure by age (in %). 
 1989-1993 sample 2004-2006 sample 
 <40 >=40&<60 >=60 <40 >=40&<60 >=60 
Village clinic 51.54 48.22 40.94 23.44 22.25 20.17 
Township center 21.76 21.58 20.65 13.64 15.68 12.38 
County hospital 6.64 10.51 11.23 15.79 16.22 21.86 
Self-care 20.06 19.70 27.17 33.25 35.77 34.24 
Other type 
   
13.88 10.09 11.35 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
One can learn from Table 7 is that the increase of self-care came from two sources. 
First, population aging especially contributed to the total increase in self-care. As the shares 
of the three age groups in total patient numbers evolved from 44%, 37% and 19% in 1989-
1993 to 16%, 43%, and 41%, patients became significantly aged. Then with a higher share of 
aged patients choosing self-care, the shares of the three age groups in the total choices of self-
care evolved from 42%, 34% and 24% in 1989-1993 to 15%, 44%, and 41%. Second, the 
younger patients also drastically increased their choices of self-care, indicating rising 
difficulty of access to healthcare providers. 
Together with the growing choice of self-care, rising catastrophic health expenditures 
is possibly another type of exclusion. Even though having shown that the poor patients were 
not discriminated in access to healthcare, they may have a higher risk of lacking enough 
money for food after their payments for healthcare. To verify this, we constructed three new 
variables.  The first, used as the dependent variable, is the consumption ratio defined as   
/, where y is trimester per head income, p is the price paid for healthcare, and (y-p) 
reflects a patient’s remaining budget for consumption after healthcare.6 The second and the 
third, used respectively as explanatory variables, are Lnasset and Lnincome, household asset 
and trimester per head income in logarithm form. The income and healthcare price are all at 
constant prices. We also used year and province dummies as control variables. If the 
coefficients of the two explanatory variables are close to zero, and thus the price of healthcare 
is proportional to income, the poor are not unequally disfavored and catastrophic health 
                                                          
6
 This equation assumes that the frequency of healthcare is 4 times per year. According to the Chinese 
Health Statistic Yearbook 2005, in rural regions, two-week visit rates were respectively 164.6% and 
139.2 % in 1998 and 2003. Converting them into an annual rate, per rural people visits were 3.34 
and 3.95 times per year. 
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expenditures are absent. On the contrary, if they are significantly larger than zero, we can 
judge that the poorer patients’ consumption expenditures after healthcare are reduced to a 
larger extent than that of the richer patients. Table 8 presents the results.  
Table 8. Regression of consumption ratio on asset and income 
 1989-1993 
 
2004-2006  
 Consumption ratio  Consumption ratio  
Lnasset 0.011  0.052  
 (0.70)  (2.12)**  
Lnincome  0.150  0.190 
  (6.60)***  (3.93)*** 
Province fix effect Yes Yes yes yes 
Year effect Yes Yes yes yes 
Constant 0.860 -0.044 0.721 -0.574 
 (21.87)*** (-0.30) (18.87)*** (1.74)* 
Observations 1457 1457 2594 2594 
F (prob>F) 1.95(0.035) 5.66 (0.000) 3.62(0.000) 5.30 (0.000) 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 
 
Note: t-Statistics are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; 
and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
We find that for 1989-1993, Lnasset is not significant in explaining the consumption 
ratio, meaning the absence of an excess burden for poorer patients. For 2004-2006, however, 
the coefficient of Lnasset is 0.052 and becomes significant. The coefficient of Lnincome also 
increased distinctly from 0.15 to 0.19, suggesting that the extent to which consumption 
expenditures were negatively affected by the healthcare expenditures was larger for poor 
patients than for richer patients. Inequality in the criterion of consumption expenditures was 
enlarged as healthcare burdens affected more low-income patients during the period.  
Thus we arrive at the key question: why the choice of self-care had increased for all 
age groups in general and for aged groups in particular, and why the catastrophic health 
expenditure became a concern? 
In previous studies to explain China’s “rural health crisis” (Dummer and Cook, 2007), 
most of them focused on demand-side causes, that is, with the collapse of the rural health 
insurance, underfunding of public facilities, rising medical care prices, and private health 
expenditures that drastically increased (Yip and Hsiao, 2008, 2009; Herd et al., 2010).  
According to our estimations, growing self-care was not mainly due to price rises since during 
the period, the price effect had reduced. We can also argue that price rises were at least 
partially compensated by significant income growth. According to the Chinese Health 
Statistic Yearbook 2005, Chinese rural populations had their per capita annual medical 
expenditures in the charge of households increase more than 10 times from 14 in 1990 to 157 
Yuan in 2004. We also know that their income increased 4.88 times from 602 to 2,936 Yuan 
Etudes et Documents n° 15, CERDI, 2013 
 
 
 
26 
 
in the same period. Thus owing to income growth, the share of medical expenditure in income 
increased from 2.3 to 5.3%. This was not a drastic increase relating to other expenditures, 
especially to housing price. 
If only to a lesser extent that the problem was on the demand side, another possibility 
is a supply-side deficiency. Due to income growth and population aging, the patients had a 
higher demand for less distant providers and their preferences became more heterogeneous. 
Only the development of small, and to some extent, middle-sized providers could adapt to this 
demand change. Meanwhile, the promotion of small and middle-sized providers is a solution 
to the concern about catastrophic health expenditures. As the services of small providers are 
cheaper, a poor population benefits more from them. Consequently, if the small and middle-
sized healthcare providers are in shortage, the drastic increase of self-care and catastrophic 
health expenditures might become unavoidable. Is this the case in rural China during the 
period?  
 
4.5  Supply Side Deficiency and Implications for Policy 
We checked the supply side aspects after the demand changes with income growth and 
population aging during the period. The healthcare demand must provide guidance to assess 
the relevance and the efficiency of the healthcare supply since a rational supply must satisfy 
demand. With this in mind, we explored the implications of the previous findings for policy-
making. 
The direct observation is that the Chinese structure of rural healthcare supply did not 
adapt to the demand during the period in question. Historically, village clinics and township 
health centers have been deficient in professional staff and in equipment, and in general 
specialized in a few less serious diseases. During this period, they were still further weakened.  
Table 9 depicts the evolution of the supply side indicators of the health sector and, in 
particular, the evolution of the balance of power between county (and above) hospitals, 
township health centers and village clinics in 1990, 2004 and 2011. Note that they are 
representative of large, middle-sized and small healthcare providers.  
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Table 9. Some indicators of different health institutions 
 
 Hospitals at the county and 
above levels 
Townships health centers Village clinics 
Year  1990 2004 2011 1990 2004 2011 1990 2004 2011 
Number of units 14,377 18,396 21,979 47,749 41,626 37,295 803,956 551,600 662,894 
Health professional 1,763.1 1,904.8 3,705.5 776.9 881.1 981.2 1,231.5 883.1 1,126.4 
Beds 1,868.9 2,363.5 3,705.1 722.9 668.9 1,026.3       
Number of visits 1,494 1,305 2,259 1,065 681 867     1,792 
Per unit 
professional 123 104 168 16.27 21.17 26.31 1.64 1.37 1.91 
Per unit beds 130 129 168 15.14 16.07 27.52       
Professionals/1,000 
rural population       0.99 1.18 1.32 1.38 1.00 1.27 
Beds/1,000 rural 
population       0.81 0.77 1.16 
  
 
Per unit number of 
visits 104 71 103 22 16 23 
 2.23* 2.70 
Per professional 
number of visits 847 685 610 1,371 773 884 
 1,459* 1,591 
* 2008 data. 
 
Source: Chinese Health Statistic Yearbook 2005 and Chinese Health Statistic Yearbook 2012. The 
number of institutions is in ones, health professional and beds are in thousands, the number of visits is 
in millions per year, per unit health professional, per unit beds, and professional/1,000 rural population 
and beds/1,000 rural population are in ones, per unit number of visits is in thousands, and per 
professional number of visits is in ones. 
 
Between 1990 and 2004, relating to county (and above) hospitals, township health 
centers and village clinics had their resources significantly decreased. As township health 
centers and village clinics principally cover the healthcare of rural populations, these data 
confirm that Chinese allocation of healthcare resources privileged urban areas during this 
period. The policy of the Chinese government consisted of reinforcing the position of large 
hospitals to the detriment of smaller healthcare providers, especially the village clinics during 
the period 1990-2004. Unlike county hospitals that had their unit numbers and professional 
staff increased by 28% and 8%, the numbers of village clinics dramatically decreased by 31% 
and 28%. For the township health centers, their unit numbers had a decrease of 13%.  
It must be argued that the process of urbanization cannot give a reason for this trend. 
According to official statistics, rural populations had reduced by 10% in this period, much 
lower than this dramatic medical care supply contraction in rural areas. A good indicator of 
the coverage of rural populations by healthcare providers is the number of professional staff 
per 1000 rural population. It decreased from 1.38 to 1.00 for village clinics. It increased from 
0.99 to 1.18 for township health centers, and their professional staff increased by 13%.  But, 
these increases were mainly for serving the growing urban population living in towns.7 As 
                                                          
7
 Township health centers are set in towns (zhen) and townships (xiang). They are at the same 
administration level, but towns include a growing share of the urban population living in them, while 
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indicators of equipment levels, the number of beds and the number of beds per 1000 rural 
population for township health centers even significantly decreased. Unlike county hospitals 
that had their number of beds increase more than 26%, this number for township health 
centers decreased by 7.5%.  The number of beds per 1000 rural population for township 
health centers decreased by 26%. 
This evolution did not respond to the demand for geographical proximity revealed by 
the result of this study, since only keeping enough numbers of qualified small, and, to some 
extent, middle-sized healthcare providers could satisfy this demand. This medical care policy 
focusing on urban and large hospitals to the detriment of smaller healthcare providers may be 
the main cause of the Chinese rural health crisis in this period. The consequence of this supply 
deficiency in rural areas was a degradation of the performance of small and middle-sized 
healthcare providers in terms of the number of visits. For township centers, this number 
decreased 36%. Their per unit number of visits and per professional number of visits 
decreased 26% and 42% respectively. The data for village clinics are missing. From the 
surveyed data used in this study, the number of visits might have decreased by 50%. 
From Table 9, we also notice that in 2011, the Chinese government began to correct 
this serious bias. The coverage of rural populations by healthcare providers in terms of the 
number of professional staff per 1000 rural population had increased from 1.00 to 1.27 for 
village clinics, though was still lower than the 1990 level. This number for township health 
centers had significantly increased from 1.18 to 1.32. Township heath centers also 
significantly improved their equipment levels. Their number of beds had increased by 52% 
between 2004 and 2011. Thus, the beds per 1000 rural population, after a decrease of 5% 
between 1990 and 2004, had increased by 51% between 2004 and 2011.  
Owing to these changes focusing on “repairing” the damages caused in the previous 
period, the productivity of rural healthcare providers was appreciably boosted. Before 2008, 
there were no statistics on village clinics’ number of visits. The comparison between 2008 and 
2011 revealed that the number of visits has increased by 31%. Per unit number of visits and 
per professional number of visits were both in progression by 21% and 9%. These numbers 
for township health centers were also in growth. The number of visits increased by 27% after 
a decrease of 36% between 1990 and 2004. Their per unit number of visits and per 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
townships, in principle, only contain rural populations. The share of towns in the total number of 
towns plus townships increased from 20% in 1990 to 53% in 2004, meaning that a growing share of 
patients of township health centers were in the urban population. 
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professional number of visits, after drastic decreases of 26% and 44% between 1990 and 2004, 
increased by 42% and 14%. This may be a big lesson for China to adjust its structure of the 
rural medical care supply in the future. Its large hospitals in big cities are actually crowded 
with patients coming from the countryside, and their supply capabilities will always be 
deficient if the government does not make a bigger effort to enhance the supply capability of 
small and middle-sized healthcare providers in rural areas. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We constructed two samples of rural patients surveyed within the same regions, but 
with an interval of 18 years. We focused on the two most important factors that could lead 
patients’ healthcare demand to change: general income growth and population aging.  
Four main results can be highlighted. First, while in both periods there was a clear 
price effect, this effect was weaker in 2004-2006. This corresponds well to the fact that during 
the period, the general income growth and population aging led the patients to be less 
sensitive to healthcare price. 
Second, we observed a strong distance effect in 2004-2006, while for 1989-1993 we 
did not. This result also coincides with general income growth and population aging. While 
income growth led patients to be less sensible to distance, aged patients attached more 
importance to proximity. The result suggests that the aging effect overweighed income effects, 
leading the distance effect to be stronger.  
Third, analysis on preference heterogeneity shows that the heterogeneity in price 
preferences considerably increased in the second period. This is logical since both income 
growth and population aging led the patients to be more sensitive to other observable and 
unobservable provider-specific attributes and patient-specific tastes. On the other hand, while 
aging increased patients’ preference to proximity and reduced the heterogeneity in distance 
preferences, income growth allowed more heterogeneous distance preferences. The overall 
heterogeneity in distance preferences was decreasing, indicating that the aging effect had 
dominated the income effect.   
Fourth, the Chinese structure of rural healthcare supply in adapting to this demand 
evolution should have reinforced the small, and to some extent, middle-sized providers in 
number and in quality because they are closer to villages and are more able to satisfy 
heterogeneous demand if they are enough diversified and multi-functional. The reinforcement 
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of small and middle providers could also be more helpful for poor populations, which became 
a concern in rural China due to increasing inequality, because the services of small providers 
are in general cheaper. 
However, this was not the way followed by the Chinese rural medical care system 
during this period. To cope with the urbanization process, the policy consisted of reinforcing 
the position of large hospitals to the detriment of small healthcare providers, especially the 
village clinics. As the consequence of this deficiency of qualified small and middle-sized 
healthcare providers, we identified two types of exclusions. On the one hand, there was a 
straight increase in the share of the patients, especially aged patients, to choose self-care. On 
the other hand, there was a rising trend of catastrophic health expenditures, which principally 
punished the poorer patients. 
Our findings has broad implications for most developing countries to adjust their 
medical care supply and rural medical care systems in developing countries, since they all 
face rural population aging, industrialization (hopefully with rising incomes) and 
urbanization. According to United Nations (2009), in the less developed regions, older 
persons account today for just 8 per cent of the population but by 2050 they are expected to 
account for a fifth of the population. The pace of population aging is faster in developing 
countries than in developed countries. Consequently, developing countries will have less time 
to adjust to its consequences.  
In the arbitrage between rural development and urbanization, the adjustment of 
medical care supply is too easily biased in favor of large hospitals in urban areas in the name 
of the efficiencies derived from scale economics and concentration. Our findings suggest that 
better coverage by more qualified and multifunctional small and middle-sized healthcare 
providers is desirable in the face of more heterogeneous and pro-proximity demand, boosted 
by income growth and population aging. This is perhaps the most important message 
delivered by this study. 
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